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Also in this section:
Improvising Peace - This Can't Last
The New York Post, April 29, 2003
by Jonathan Foreman
The young soldiers who found themselves administering this city just days after conquering it have done a superb job despite limited resources, including the small numbers of troops.
You might not know this: Much of the reporting from the Iraqi capital is at best misleading, at worst a tissue of lies designed to further an anti-American agenda. The media also concentrated on the areas initially controlled by the Marines, whose small numbers, warrior culture, distrust of Iraqis (understandable, after so many Marine casualties from false surrenders), and lack of peacekeeping experience led first to some unfortunate incidents and then to their replacement by Army units.
But in neighborhoods rich and poor (there are many more of the latter), captains and staff sergeants have made contact with local leaders, established curfews, intimidated and restrained looters (without gunning them down) and done their best to provide humanitarian aid.
They have done so without interpreters: CENTCOM seems to have thought it was possible to conquer and administer an Arab country without Arabic speakers.
And without the help of civil-affairs experts, who are only just arriving here in any numbers, and many of whom are clearly intimidated by the size of the job and by the sporadic gunfire in the night.
And also without guidance from above as to such important matters as whether local homeowners should be allowed to defend themselves with firearms.
Indeed, the "laws" differ in areas controlled by different company, because these NCOs and junior officers are all having to improvise on their own.
They have no choice. Go into any battalion or brigade headquarters, and you immediately encounter a dense torpor: Colonels, lieutenant colonels and majors sit around adrift in dreams of stars - generals' stars, Silver Stars, Bronze Stars. For them, the war is over. "They know they are going home in six weeks or less," one captain lamented to me, "and all they think about is promotions and medals."
Worse still, it took these senior officers until long after their areas of the city were secure to confront the task of keeping order. Some battalions in the 3rd Infantry Division's Second Brigade (which controls most of the city) seemed to be expecting a reanimated Medina Division to come down the street at any moment. Even when they did begin to authorize systematic, if cautious, ventures away from headquarters, the lead came from junior officers and NCOs.
Luckily, many 3rd ID NCOs and junior officers have peacekeeping experience from operations in the former Yugoslavia, Haiti, Somalia, etc. Yet many of the higher-ups do not: The army's promotion structure (which essentially requires that "field grade" officers who have commanded a company take staff positions at posts like Fort Knox and Fort Leavenworth for at least five years) ensures that almost everyone between the rank of major and colonel has missed out on the peacekeeping missions of the last decade.
In the shadow of a burning office building, I watched a captain and an SAS soldier beg a lieutenant colonel to let them start "presence patrols" to discourage looters and reassure the local population. He listened for a second, then said to the amazed captain, "Hey, your face is dirty. Why is your face dirty?"
So far, the failure of army brass to come to grips with the realities and responsibilities of occupation hasn't had much cost. So far, the population hasn't grown bored or irritated with the U.S. presence, such is the depth of Iraqi gratitude for liberation.
But the slowness of senior officers and CENTCOM itself to adjust to the tasks of occupation puts at risk everything that has been won here.
As one captain told me, "We've gotta start coming up with stuff, otherwise they'll think its all just bull----. And it's only a matter of time. We need information to pass on to the people . . . And by the way, they know that it doesn't take five days to get stuff up from Kuwait."
One experienced NCO said that the brass "don't get it that when the first children die of dysentery because they've had to drink river water, the atmosphere here will change." Instead of being greeted by hordes of kids wanting to give them flowers, the patrols will be met with Molotov cocktails.
"Something could happen out there and they could turn just like that," says Sgt. 1st Class Michael Anslinger, whose scout platoon has carried out scores of presence patrols on both sides of the Tigris.
Furthermore, the combat-weary troops who took the city - not the ideal people to carry out the sensitive task of an occupation in any case - are exhausted. They are still not being relieved or even supplemented to a significant degree two weeks since taking the city. (Fresh troops are on their way, some from units perfectly suited to peacekeeping tasks, like the 2nd Armored Cavalry - but others from units with no experience of foreign deployment, like the 4th ID.)
For now, there are nowhere near enough troops to stop the looting. Many neighborhoods still haven't seen an American soldier even in a passing convoy. This lack of a substantial U.S. presence in the city, while it avoids "provocation," has led to a power vacuum.
And that vacuum is being filled by religious extremists (Christians are being targeted for violence when they venture into militant Shia areas) in some places, in others by street gangs who have armed themselves from the caches the Republican Guard left all over the city.
After the British took control of what is now Iraq after World War I, it took six months before they faced bloody, religiously inspired uprisings. If CENTCOM and the top brass here in Baghdad don't get their act together, the United States (or any provisional pro-American government) may yet see the same.
To avoid such a tragic aftermath to a brilliant campaign, U.S. leaders must stop moving in slow motion, face up to the immediate responsibilities of occupation and bring in enough men and material to police, administer and supply the capital city of the country they have liberated.